INTRODUCTION
As noted in Dean Harold H. Bruff's superb book, Untrodden Ground: How Presidents Interpret the Constitution, the President of the United States routinely interprets the United States Constitution. 1 How aggressively the President should interpret the Constitution is subject to significant dispute. This Article considers that issue in the context where the President is the most aggressive, i.e., when threatening to decline to enforce a federal statute because the President believes the statute is unconstitutional. Such action has become increasingly common in the past few decades as Presidents have increasingly promulgated constitutional signing statements, 2 official statements explaining how the President will enforce or decline to enforce enacted legislation based on the President's opinion regarding the legislation's constitutionality. 3 The latitude the President has or should have to interpret the Constitution is particularly important in areas such as foreign policy and national defense, where the President claims plenary constitutional authority. 4 Whether constitutional signing statements fit comfortably within our constitutional structure or are in derogation of that structure may depend on how aggressively the President interprets the Constitution.
Presidential constitutional interpretation may appear to be inconsistent with our constitutional structure, if constitutional interpretation is the primary or sole province of the Supreme Court. 5 However, constitutional interpretation is not the sole become more common. 13 Historically, signing statements included commentary about the subject legislation, such as praise for its aims and suggestions about statutory interpretation and implementation. 14 More recently, they have been issued for broader purposes, including to augment or change legislative history. 15 That use is somewhat controversial, but does not trigger the same constitutional issues that using a statement to justify a refusal to enforce a law does. 16 Constitutional signing statements are controversial, in part, because the Constitution does not indicate how much latitude the President should have to decline to enforce legislation based on his belief that legislation is unconstitutional. 17 Arguably, the President should interpret the Constitution sparely, with presidential interpretation straying as little as possible from constitutional text or the President's best guess regarding the Supreme Court's presumed interpretation of the relevant constitutional text. 12. See SHANE, supra note 2, at 132-33 (noting that signing statements are not rare, but constitutional signing statements were fairly rare before President George W. Bush's Administration).
13. See Kelley, supra note 3, at 76 (noting escalation of signing statements between Presidents Nixon and Clinton).
14. See MAY, supra note 5, at 73-75 (providing the history of signing statements and noting their various uses); PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 198 (discussing the history of signing statements and their evolution from mere statements on legislation to vehicles for voicing constitutional concerns about legislation in the second half of twentieth century); Kelley, supra note 3, at 74 (noting three kinds of signing statements: constitutional, political, and rhetorical).
15. See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 210-11 (2002) (noting use of signing statements as attempt to create or fix legislative history).
16. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 208-11 (suggesting that signing statements should not be used to determine legislative intent notwithstanding attempts to do so); see also Dellinger OLC Memo, supra note 10, at 131 (noting arguments for and against using presidential signing statements as a form of legislative history).
17. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that the American Bar Association was sufficiently troubled about the use of signing statements to convene a task force to study the issue); cf. MAY, supra note 5, at 37 ("The Constitution does not give the President a power to suspend the laws, not even when the chief executive may think that a particular law is unconstitutional.").
18. See Dellinger OLC Memo, supra note 10, at 133 (suggesting that presidential constitutional interpretation can be analogized to Supreme Court interpretation at times).
Conversely, the President-as a coequal constitutional actorcould be as free to interpret the Constitution and act on that interpretation as any other constitutional actor, including the Supreme Court, when the President deems such interpretation necessary to guide the President in discharging his or her constitutional duties. 19 Whether the expanding claims of recent Presidents regarding the chief executive's freedom to interpret the Constitution and ignore portions of legislation he believes unconstitutional are reasonable depends, in part, on how much latitude constitutional actors, including the President, believe the Constitution gives the President to act in such situations. 20 This is particularly important as the use of constitutional signing statements can augment executive power and functionally alter the Constitution's separation of powers structure. 21 The appropriate level of aggression in presidential constitutional interpretation is a live issue. Presidential constitutional interpretation was at the core of Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 22 a recent Supreme Court case that involved the clash of executive power and legislative power in the foreign policy area. 23 The case hinged on whether the President has the exclusive authority to recognize foreign nations. 24 More narrowly, the decision focused on Congress's constitutional 21. See COOPER, supra note 15, at 201 (noting that the way that the signing statement has come to be used since President Reagan took office is aggressive and evolving); PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 200 (noting the Reagan administration's strategic use of signing statements to increase presidential power).
22. 135 S. Ct. 2076 Ct. (2015 . 23. Id. at 2081 (noting that foreign policy is often left to the political branches to resolve with the judicial branch having a limited role). For an extended discussion of Zivotofsky's role in altering the foreign policy landscape, see Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112 (2015) .
24. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2081 (explaining that the pertinent issues in the case relate to the degree to which the President exercises exclusive power to recognize sovereign nations). UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 authority to pass a law that included a provision that appeared to require that the President recognize Israel as having sovereign control over Jerusalem. 25 In the wake of the legislation's passage, President George W. Bush issued a signing statement deeming that section of the law unconstitutional if it required that the President recognize Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. 26 Rather, he noted that he would interpret the statute to provide the President the option to deem Jerusalem as a part of Israel if the President so chose. 27 The case did not directly address the signing statement in siding with the President. The constitutionality of the legislation-rather than the appropriateness of the signing statement-was at issue, though the case may help illuminate how a President may interpret the Constitution and whether the President should act on that interpretation. This Article explores whether the President should interpret the Constitution aggressively and, if so, whether the President should act on such aggressive interpretations. Part I examines whether the presidential oath and other constitutional duties obligate the President to interpret the Constitution. Part II considers constitutional signing statements as the manifestation of an aggressive approach to presidential constitutional interpretation. Part III considers whether the Constitution is a legal document or a political document, and how that determination might affect how aggressive the President should be when interpreting the Constitution. Part IV considers how the Supreme Court's and Congress's constitutional interpretations might constrain presidential constitutional interpretation or suggest restrained presidential constitutional interpretation. Part V considers Zivotofsky v. Kerry and whether it provides the President additional arguments to support an aggressive approach to constitutional interpretation, particularly when considering matters related to executive power. The Constitution requires the President to interpret the Constitution and may allow him to act based on that interpretation. The presidential oath of office requires that the President "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States" and "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution." 29 The oath requires that the President ensure that presidential and other governmental actions comport with and support the Constitution. 30 The Constitution also requires that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 31 Given that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the Take Care Clause appears to require that the President interpret the Constitution to determine whether to execute laws that he believes are unconstitutional. Conversely, the Take Care Clause could require that he execute all laws that have been duly enacted. Reading the presidential oath and the Take Care Clause together could lead in any of three directions. First, the President may have broad latitude to interpret the Constitution based on the belief that he has a duty to decline to enforce legislation he believes is unconstitutional. 32 Second, the President may have the discretion to decline to enforce a statute he deems unconstitutional, but no obligation to do so. 33 Third, the President may have a duty to enforce a duly enacted law notwithstanding his belief regarding the law's unconstitutionality. 34 Which approach is appropriate in any particular situation depends on how aggressively the executive 29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 30. See BRUFF, supra note 1, at 1 ("The obvious purpose of the oath is to impose legal obligations."). But see MAY, supra note 5, at 38-41 (suggesting that the oath does not require a President to ignore laws that he believes to be unconstitutional).
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 32. Kelley, supra note 3, at 77 (explaining that since Watergate and Vietnam, Presidents have aggressively interpreted the oath and Take Care Clause to support executive power in the face of efforts by various institutions to limit the executive's powers).
33. Bradley & Posner, supra note 11, at 335 ("Still other commentators argue for an intermediate position whereby Presidents may sometimes disregard statutes that they believe to be unconstitutional, such as when a statute violates a Supreme Court precedent or invades executive power.").
34. MAY, supra note 5, at 37 (discussing the framers' beliefs regarding a President's inability to nullify a law that he deems unconstitutional). UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 branch decides to interpret the Constitution and whether the legislative and judicial branches cabin that aggressiveness.
A. The Oath
Presidential constitutional interpretation begins with the presidential oath of office. 35 The President may not assume the office of President until he takes the oath. 36 The oath requires that the President's actions be consistent with the Constitution, but the oath remains subject to interpretation. The oath requires that the President preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, but not necessarily that the President preserve, protect, and defend the United States. violate the Constitution may protect the United States. For example, President Lincoln believed that the oath required that he preserve the Union and the Constitution. 40 Consequently, he was willing to take action that appeared to contravene constitutional text to save the Union. 41 The oath requires that the President be faithful to the Constitution. 42 What that faithfulness entails may be for the President to determine. What faithfulness entails also depends on what other obligations the Constitution places on the President through text such as the Take Care Clause. The presidential oath, when combined with other constitutional obligations, may suggest that the President has significant latitude to interpret the Constitution.
B. The Take Care Clause
The President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed is more specific than the presidential oath. How the duty is interpreted may structure the scope of the President's latitude to interpret the Constitution. The Take Care Clause can be read to require that the President interpret the Constitution and decline to enforce unconstitutional laws. Conversely, the Take Care Clause can be read to require merely that the President makes sure that executive branch officials faithfully execute duly enacted federal laws. 43 The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Any law-federal or state-that contravenes the Constitution is 40. See BRUFF, supra note 1, at 127 (noting that Lincoln saw a Union where others saw "a confederation of sovereign states").
41. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Interpreting Presidential Powers, 63 DUKE L.J. 347, 349 (2013) (noting that President Lincoln "concluded that the emergency rendered it constitutionally permissible for him to take steps that would almost surely have been legally impermissible in less extraordinary times"); see also BRUFF, supra note 1, at 132 (discussing President Lincoln's actions in 1861 that violated constitutional text, such as unilaterally raising an army and navy and spending money from the U.S. treasury without an appropriation, which were later ratified by Congress).
42. 
C. Clearly Unconstitutional Laws
If the President has no latitude to interpret the Constitution and to decline to enforce unconstitutional laws, a President may be forced to execute a law that he believes is unconstitutional. That is not necessarily a problem when the constitutionality of the law at issue is debatable and the President could be wrong about his interpretation. In that instance, a refusal to exercise the law would trigger a violation of the faithful execution duty. When the constitutionality of a law is not clear, the President arguably should assume that the statute is constitutional. 53 However, if the President is correct about the law's unconstitutionality, executing such a law could lead to an extended period of enforcement of an unconstitutional law. 54 If the presidential oath is akin to an on/ off switch that triggers the obligation to enforce constitutional laws and the obligation to decline to enforce unconstitutional laws, it is unclear that the oath would condone a practice that would require that the President enforce a law that he believes is unconstitutional.
Supreme Court "decisions and statements could be read as providing modest support for a Presidential power to disregard at least some unconstitutional statutes").
51. President Nixon's position on impoundment-that he could decline to spend money that had already been appropriated for a particular purposetriggers the notion that a President may have to be made to enforce federal law. Requiring the President to enforce a law the President believes to be unconstitutional is even more problematic if the law at issue appears to be clearly unconstitutional. By enforcing such a law, the President would appear to violate his oath of office by adhering to a narrow interpretation of the Take Care Clause. However, any requirement that the President enforce a law that appears clearly unconstitutional may be a feature of the constitutional order rather than a bug. The President can work within the constitutional system to attempt to procure a determination of constitutionality before acting on his independent interpretation. 55 This may not always be practical or possible given that the Supreme Court does not issue advisory opinions and may only render judgment in a live case or controversy. 56 The President can simply assert a duty to decline to enforce a clearly unconstitutional law and refuse to enforce the law. That solution is impossible to administer given that whether a law ought to be deemed clearly unconstitutional depends on who is interpreting the statute and the Constitution. Just as importantly, there may be little that would limit the duty. Over time, the duty would almost certainly expand to provide the President with a fairly broad capacity to exercise presidential prerogative. Even without an explicit duty to interpret the Constitution, Presidents have deemed their latitude to interpret the Constitution to be broad. 57 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND VETOES
Constitutional signing statements explain how the President will execute a law or why he will decline to execute the law, consistent with her understanding of the Constitution. They can be considered acts of candor or acts of defiance. 60 When a President declines to enforce legislation he believes unconstitutional, he may be thought to be either a usurper of power or a coequal constitutional actor reasonably interpreting the Constitution. How the President and the signing statement are characterized may depend on how closely the argument underlying the signing statement conforms to standard constitutional analysis and also may depend on whether the veto should be deemed the President's sole tool for expressing her belief that legislation is unconstitutional. 61
A. Refusal to Enforce Law
A constitutional signing statement that threatens a refusal to execute a law can be based on the belief that a provision of the law is unconstitutional no matter how the law is interpreted. Alternatively, it can be based on the belief that the provision could be interpreted either in a constitutional manner or in an unconstitutional manner, with the signing signing statements a part of the legal landscape, "so as in the future to be able to claim that the signing statements establish precedents that are part of the record of constitutional interpretation"); Fallon, supra note 41, at 364 ("[P]revious administrations have cited executive precedent to justify assertions of unilateral executive authority to do nearly anything that the President has deemed desirable in the name of national security, up to and including the initiation of war in every practical sense of the term.").
60. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 20, at 1114 (distinguishing noncompliance with the law and genuine disagreement regarding what the law requires). A signing statement can be an act of defiance when it provides little explanation for its issuance. See SHANE, supra note 2, at 135 (noting that many of President George W. Bush's signing statements were "based on no legal authority whatever and had nothing to do with any plausible version of the public interest"); Kelley, supra note 3, at 73.
61. Some argue that the ideology embedded in the signing statement, rather than the practice of issuing signing statements, is the real issue. See Bradley & Posner, supra note 11, at 310 ("All of this [criticism of signing statements] suggests that the real concern is not with the institution of signing statements but with the Bush administration's underlying views of executive power."). UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 statement making clear that the provision will only be executed in a manner the President believes to be constitutional. The latter position is sensible unless it is clear that the President has interpreted the legislation in a manner clearly contrary to Congress's intent in order to claim to be enforcing the law while actually declining to do so. 62 In that circumstance, the President's position is functionally similar to a claim that the legislation is unconstitutional however interpreted. A signing statement does not necessarily challenge congressional authority. 63 Rather, it can be considered a necessary manifestation of executive power. The President retains constitutional control over the executive branch and must direct executive branch officials on how to enforce the law. 64 A signing statement guides executive branch officials in enforcing or declining to enforce the law. 65 A constitutional signing statement may be most appropriate when legislation concerns an issue on which the President has primary authority, thereby infringing executive power and upsetting the system of separation of powers embedded in the Constitution. 66 62. Some Presidents appear to have intentionally misinterpreted the law. See COOPER, supra note 15, at 208 (noting the practice of "interpreting provisions that were clearly intended to be mandatory as advisory only"); Bradley & Posner, supra note 11, at 342 ("[I]t is useful to distinguish between situations in which a statute is truly ambiguous, and situations in which the President is purporting to interpret a statute when in fact his interpretation is contrary to its plain meaning.").
63. They can also be bald attempts to increase power. See SHANE, supra note 2, at 141 ("What happened from 2001 to 2006 was Bush Administration exploitation of congressional passivity to generate a series of documentary artifacts that can impersonate as legal authority for unilateral Presidentialist legal interpretation.").
64. See id. at 138-39 (discussing signing statements that object to Congress telling executive branch officials to do something because it conflicts with the President's right to tell executive branch officials what to do as unitary executive). However, the President's belief that he alone can direct executive branch officials may not be as strong as some suggest. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 219-22 (discussing unitary executive theory and suggesting that the claim that only the President can give orders to executive branch officials is not convincing based on arguments extant at the framing of the Constitution).
65. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 207 (noting that the Dellinger OLC memo suggests that signing statements can be used to direct the actions of executive officials).
66. See Dellinger OLC Memo, supra note 10, at 134 ("If so, then a signing statement that challenges what the President determines to be an unconstitutional encroachment on his power, or that announces the President's unwillingness to enforce (or willingness to litigate) such a provision, can be a valid However, under certain circumstances, a signing statement is an act of defiance. When a signing statement merely contains a general assertion that the law at issue infringes on the President's executive power and will be interpreted in a manner consistent with a broad vision of executive power, it appears to be an act that intentionally disrespects legislative authority. 67 The latter approach was arguably taken by President George W. Bush's administration and may have triggered some of the concern about signing statements during his presidency. 68 Presidents who issue constitutional signing statements presumably believe they have a duty or a right to decline to enforce unconstitutional laws. 69 If they are correct, a constitutional signing statement is a legitimate exercise of power, even if the President's constitutional interpretation is ultimately rejected. 70 Conversely, if the President's duty is to execute the law, not to decide whether to execute the law, signing statements are generally suspect and may be considered a usurpation of legislative power even if the President's opinion on the law's constitutionality is ultimately deemed correct. 71 As the President is the only constitutional and reasonable exercise of Presidential authority."); see also Prakash, supra note 9, at 1624 ("One might suppose that the President may disregard statutes only when he believes that they unconstitutionally infringe upon his constitutional powers. For instance, if a statute forbids the President from vetoing legislation, he may nonetheless issue vetoes if he believes that the veto prohibition is unconstitutional.").
67. See Kelley, supra note 3, at 73 (noting President George W. Bush's assertion that he would generally construe law to comport with his powers under the unitary executive doctrine).
68. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 194-96 (arguing that the breadth of the justifications that President Bush asserted to underlie his signing statements challenged the Constitution's separation of powers regime).
69. See Dellinger OLC Memo, supra note 10, at 133 ("In each of the last three Administrations, the Department of Justice has advised the President that the Constitution provides him with the authority to decline to enforce a clearly unconstitutional law."); COOPER, supra note 15, at 206-07 ("The Office of Legal Counsel under the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations argued that the President has the power to refuse to enforce a statute if he or she determines that the statute violates the Constitution."); Kelley, supra note 3, at 84 (noting that Walter Dellinger's Office of Legal Counsel memorandum on signing statements, Dellinger OLC Memo, supra note 10, suggested that they are consistent with the President's obligations under the Take Care Clause and the presidential oath).
70. However, if signing statements are meant merely to expand executive power, there is a problem. See COOPER, supra note 15, at 202 (noting use of signing statements as an attempt to expand executive branch authority).
71. 
B. The Veto
If a constitutional signing statement essentially negates legislative power, the President's issuance of such a statement can be considered particularly problematic because the President already has a role in the legislative process. The President may veto legislation. 74 The President's veto power affords him an opportunity to voice constitutional concerns during the legislative process. 75 The President can and arguably should veto bills he believes contain unconstitutional provisions. 76 A veto is not necessary if the President merely objects to a particular interpretation of a statutory provision rather than to the entire provision. 77 The veto is not absolute, but it allows the President to slow legislation he believes unconstitutional. 78 monarchical power to suspend the laws, which was explicitly not given to the President).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 73. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 227 (noting that there are other ways to address and resolve constitutional interpretation questions than allowing the President to assert what the law is).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Some suggest that the veto may be the sole appropriate action the President can take in this circumstance. See MAY, supra note 5, at 38 (suggesting the founders believed the President should veto a law or go to court to have it declared unconstitutional); PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 214 ("That the designers of our Constitution gave the executive a qualified veto is a strong argument that they did not intend that the President have the authority not to carry out the law.").
75. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 4 ("The power to veto a bill, although exercised by the executive branch, is legislative in nature.").
76. See SHANE, supra note 2, at 133 (suggesting that the President should veto unconstitutional bills, but that good reasons for declining to do so exist).
77. At times, vetoing an entire bill is not feasible. See COOPER, supra note 15, at 211 (noting the argument that when vetoing a huge bill is not practical, issuing a signing statement has been used by Presidents to address the issue of smaller unconstitutional portions of law).
78. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (providing that a veto may be overridden if two-thirds of each house of Congress repasses the legislation).
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A veto can yield three possible results. First, Congress may pass a new bill without the offending provision. That is preferred from the President's perspective, but is unlikely. Congress and the President may discuss legislation while it is being crafted. If the President made clear that a provision in the original bill would trigger a veto, but Congress left the provision in the bill, it is unlikely that Congress would pass a second bill post-veto without the offending provision. This is so particularly if Congress believes the offending provision to be constitutional and beneficial. There may be other political reasons why Congress might pass the bill the President prefers after the veto, but it is unclear that a constitutional objection would likely lead to such a result.
Second, in response to the veto, Congress could decline to pass any substitute legislation. If so, the President has foregone all of the possible benefits that would have accompanied the original bill. This might result from the President and Congress standing on principle, but is not necessarily best for the country. However, if the country lost good legislation because Congress wanted a provision in the law that the President reasonably believed was unconstitutional, the loss may be Congress's responsibility rather than the President's.
Third, in response to the veto, Congress could override the veto and keep the offending provision in the law. Presumably, the President would still issue a signing statement, as the override would not necessarily make the provision any less unconstitutional from the President's perspective, and refuse to execute the law. 79 That is roughly the same position the legislation would have been in had the President issued a signing statement when the legislation was first passed. Rather than going through a veto override process, signing the legislation while flagging the constitutional issue in a signing statement and leaving its ultimate resolution to the Supreme Court may be the preferred outcome under a constitutional order that deems the Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter of constitutionality. This does not convert signing statements into 79. However, that approach may be of recent vintage. See MAY, supra note 5, at 69 (noting that through 1981, Presidents almost uniformly implemented statutes that they believed were unconstitutional when such statutes were passed over the President's veto, even when it was very unlikely that other litigants would be able to challenge the statute in court 
C. Implications
Relying on the veto power alone to signal concerns with the constitutionality of legislation may not be an adequate solution. 82 The veto is a reasonable way, and a threatened veto may be the best way, to voice concerns regarding the constitutionality of legislation. 83 However, if the veto is ineffective, a President with an aggressive view of the Take Care Clause may believe he must decline to execute the statute. 84 A signing statement honestly announces that intention. The President could sign a bill into law without a signing statement, then decline to enforce the part of the law to which he objects. 85 The President may pay a political price for issuing an honest signing statement, but the political price arguably should come from being wrong about whether the law is unconstitutional rather than from acting on the belief that 80. Some argue that a signing statement can act as a line-item veto. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 15, at 223-25 (treating signing statement as line-item veto that is just as problematic to the legislative process as the unconstitutional legislative veto was); MAY, supra note 5, at 72 (suggesting that signing statement is the equivalent of line-item veto when "the constitutional objection is coupled with a Presidential refusal to comply with the law"); PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 202.
81. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1622 (noting that a law that has been deemed unconstitutional is not stricken from statute books and can be enforced if the President wishes).
82. See id. at 1619 (suggesting that the fact of veto power does not alter the President's duty to decline to enforce unconstitutional laws).
83. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 5 (suggesting that the threat of a veto may encourage Congress to make changes to a bill that will make the legislation palatable to the President).
84. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1616-17 (arguing that the oath and Take Care Clause require that the President disregard statutes he believes are unconstitutional).
85. A President could decline to enforce the law through a form of prosecutorial discretion. This is arguably occurring with respect to enforcing or declining to enforce some federal marijuana laws. If the gaps created by the Constitution's imprecise language are filled principally through legal analysis and interpretation, the Constitution may be treated as a legal document that ought to be interpreted primarily or solely by courts. If those gaps are filled principally through reference to the political principles that undergird the Constitution, the Constitution can be treated primarily as a political document that can be interpreted through a principled political lens by the President and Congress. The Constitution's meaning would be determined by the political branches or more generally by the political process.
The appropriate scope of the President's latitude to interpret the Constitution and to act on that interpretation may be significantly affected by which of these two visions the President and other constitutional actors adopt. That may depend on how the Constitution has been interpreted in practice through the iterative processes that can settle the text's meaning. 89 Whether the Constitution is considered a legal document or a political document can affect how the President defines unconstitutionality. If the Constitution is treated as a legal document, a President arguably should deem a statute unconstitutional only if it is inconsistent with the Constitution's text. Conversely, if the Constitution is treated as a political document, a statute may be unconstitutional if it violates the principles underlying the Constitution.
A. Constitution as a Legal Document
The Constitution may be considered a legal document that has political principles embedded in its text. 90 
B. The Constitution as a Political Document
The Constitution may be treated as a political document that contains legally enforceable rules. 102 It creates a governing structure for the United States and expounds a set of principles for administering the country and for fostering a more perfect union. It may serve as a guidebook that provides certain bedrock principles, but which affords room for future generations to create the republic each generation needs in order to foster the preamble's goals. 103 Though the Constitution contains some rules that must be adhered to as law, the document's underlying political principles may exist to guide the interpretation of the legally enforceable rules embedded in its text. 104 The Constitution's purpose was political; political principles are embedded in the document. (2006) ("The role of the Declaration of Independence in constitutional interpretation is contested. Some argue that it is 'at the heart of the Constitution,' that the Declaration 'is fundamental to a proper understanding of the Constitution,' and that Americans should interpret 'the Constitution through the lens of the Declaration.'") (citations omitted).
103. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (2011) ("In every generation, We the People of the United States make the Constitution our own by calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what they mean in our own time.").
104. See EPPS, supra note 90, at xii ("[The Constitution's] text offers us at the most basic level the means we can employ today to create a 'more perfect union . . . to ourselves and our posterity'; at a deeper level, it tells us much about who we are and how we got here. It is a tool kit of our politics and a testament of our history.").
105. For example, the Court recently located an equal sovereignty doctrine embedded in the Constitution. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (divining equal sovereignty principle gleaned from the structure of the Constitution).
106. U.S. CONST. pmbl. was then a confederation of independent states. 107 The preamble's reference to "We The People" as establishing the Union, rather than to the states creating the Union-as was the case with the Articles of Confederation-suggested that the Constitution formed a nation rather than merely a new and somewhat stronger confederation than had existed under the Articles of Confederation. 108 The strength of the union matters, as the obligations states owe to a nation and that the nation may owe to states may be different than the obligations owed by and to a confederation. 109 Similarly, the obligations owed to citizens or people subject to a nation may be different than the obligations owed to citizens of states that have joined a confederation. All of these issues and principles may be relevant to how the constitutional text should be interpreted. 110 Though constitutional text can usually be read to create legal rights and obligations, the point of the text can be quite political. 111 The Constitution contains fundamental, but undefined, phrases, such as "executive power," "the equal protection of the laws," and "privileges and immunities." 112 It also includes fundamental notions-such as the existence of undefined unenumerated rights and powers-that are not 108. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. III (deeming the Articles to create "a firm league of friendship").
109. For example, the constitution guarantees that each state will have a republican government. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. That guarantee makes more sense in a nation than in a confederation.
110. See Chambers, supra note 87, at 113 ("If the Constitution is literally just a mass of words that creates a government and governs those subject to it based on its commands, so be it. If, however, it is supposed to provide a way or vision of living, it should be made as consistent as possible with the way of living it embodies.").
111. For example, Article I gives Congress the legal right to "be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members." U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 1. However, the implication of the text is that each House is to be given some latitude to govern itself and its members, though that freedom is nowhere near complete. Further, the Supreme Court's political question doctrine suggests that some constitutional issues are to be solved by politics or through the political process rather than by law. 114 For example, the Senate's advice and consent power is exercised in conjunction with the President's nominating power. 115 That suggests that the President and the Senate may disagree regarding Supreme Court nominees, but must come to an agreement before a nominee is confirmed. However, the document does not discuss how the President and the Senate will resolve a disagreement regarding a nominee or address a Senate's refusal to hold hearings or vote on a nomination. Without any legal principle to resolve the issue, the political process appears to be the Constitution's preferred (or only) method of resolution. 116 Conversely, the Constitution provides a specific mechanism for resolving certain other legislative disputes. The President may veto legislation, but the legislation becomes law if two-thirds of the Senate and of the House of Representatives vote to override the veto. 117 The President and Congress may disagree regarding the substance of the legislation, but the legislation is law once the veto is overridden. The Constitution's clear rules coupled with the existence of federal courts to declare the legislation to be law may suggest that the Constitution's clear rules are legally enforceable rules that accompany a political document's statement of principles. 115. The President nominates, but the Senate must "advise and consent" to the nomination before an appointment can be made. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
116. See Nelson, supra note 96, at 597 ("The modern political-question doctrine effectively takes this position; one of its functions is to distinguish between indeterminacies that the courts will address and indeterminacies whose liquidation they will leave to others. The Supreme Court has identified a few indeterminacies whose resolution the Constitution itself implicitly commits to nonjudicial actors.").
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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C. Filling the Constitution's Interstices
Some of the Constitution's text is clear; some is unclear. Clear text must be treated as easily interpreted binding law. 118 For example, a thirty-three-year-old cannot be President given the requirement that the President be at least thirty-five years old. 119 In addition, a state cannot be denied the votes of its senators without its consent. 120 However, the Constitution contains pockets of uncertainty. That uncertainty is created by unclear text or by a dearth of text, and can create interstices in the document that must be filled. How the gaps are filled is important. They can be filled through legal analysis or through political analysis or a combination of both. Legal analysis may require that the interpreter consider the remainder of the document to determine what the text at issue means. If a meaning cannot be found, the text may have to be considered silent on the issue or ambiguous, and possibly impossible to apply. 121 Conversely, when text is interpreted based on the political principles underlying the document, the meaning of ambiguous text can become the meaning of the text that is most consistent with those principles, even if that reading may not appear to be the most natural reading of the text. The nature of the document may depend on how those uncertain interstices are filled or have been filled with meaning. If those gaps are filled primarily through textual and legal analysis, the Constitution functionally becomes a legal document with embedded political principles. Conversely, if those interstices are filled primarily based on the political principles that undergird the Constitution, the Constitution functionally becomes a political document that contains legally enforceable rules. The interstices are filled over time by presidential and congressional action and inaction and by judicial decisions. 128 There are few rules in the Constitution regarding the impeachment trial for the President other than that the Chief Justice of the United States must preside at trial and that two-thirds of senators must vote to rise to a lawsuit."). Indeed, almost any hint of supposed authority can support governmental action. See SHANE, supra note 2, at 112-13 (noting that Presidents may be comfortable with their actions and Americans may believe we still have a government of laws as long as some authority for Presidential acts exists, be it "a constitutional provision, a statute, a judicial opinion, or an executive branch regulation").
123. 
D. Constitutionality and Unconstitutionality
How unconstitutionality is defined may depend on the nature of the Constitution. Unconstitutionality can have at least two meanings. It may be narrowly construed to apply to only those actions that violate constitutional text or it may be more broadly construed to apply to any actions that violate the principles underlying the Constitution. 131 Those approaches to unconstitutionality may not differ much in practice, but they describe different mindsets. A text-bound view of unconstitutionality will tend to yield fewer unconstitutional actions than a broader principles-based view of unconstitutionality. A broader vision of unconstitutionality provides more latitude to the President to declare laws unconstitutional and decline to enforce legislation as a result.
Unconstitutional legislation can come in three different forms. First, legislation can violate constitutional text and the principles underlying the Constitution. The Sedition Act, passed in the early days of the Republic to combat supposed seditious libel against the government, may qualify. It arguably violated the text of the First Amendment through its ban on certain forms of political expression. 134 There is no constitutional text that stops Congress from limiting the President from firing one of his cabinet secretaries. However, if one believes that the Constitution encompasses a principle that allows the President to control executive branch officials, possibly through a strong view of the executive power vesting clause, the Tenure of Office Act's limitation on when and how the President could dismiss a cabinet secretary would likely appear unconstitutional. 135 Third, a statute may violate the text of the Constitution, but possibly not its spirit. This may describe the line-item budget veto, a legislative provision that allowed the President to cancel individual appropriations in the name of budget balancing. 136 The line-item veto violates the text of the Constitution by forgoing the legislative process of presenting an entire bill to the President to be signed or vetoed. However, it arguably does not violate the spirit of the Constitution given the amount of budgetary and spending latitude the President already exercises consistent with his executive power. 137 Similarly, actions can violate the text of the Constitution but not violate its spirit. For example, President Lincoln believed that he had an obligation to save the Union, including taking actions that might appear unconstitutional. 135. The nature of the vesting clause is in dispute. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 20, at 1104 (noting that some claim that the executive power vesting clause "implicitly grants the President a broad range of powers" and that some disagree, but ultimately suggesting that the dispute "highlights the text's lack of specificity").
136. For a discussion of the line-item veto and its demise, see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
137. For a discussion of the power the President may exercise in budget matters, see Chambers & Logue, supra note 51.
138. See BRUFF, supra note 1, at 120 (quoting Lincoln's willingness to "violate Conversely, actions that may be allowed by the Constitution may be used in a manner that violates its spirit. For example, the Senate's filibuster is presumptively constitutional because it flows from the Senate's explicit power to make its own rules. 139 However, it can be used to functionally require a supermajority to pass legislation and to defeat the principle of majority rule that is arguably embedded in the Constitution. last word on the meaning of the legal document. Other constitutional actors-including the President-may interpret the document, but their interpretation should be of little legal moment. Conversely, if the Constitution is considered a political document, Congress and the President arguably should have broad latitude to interpret it. The Supreme Court would still have the last word on constitutional interpretation when such interpretation is necessary to decide a case. In addition, courts would continue to interpret the Constitution's legally enforceable rules. However, other constitutional actors would be free to interpret the Constitution and act on their interpretation. Congress and the President could view the Constitution as suggesting principles of law that should guide action rather than as legal text that commands particular action.
The bigger and unsolvable problem is that the Constitution may appear to be a legal document to the courts and appear to be a political document to the other branches. In the hands of a court, the Constitution could be considered a legal document that sets specific barriers when it is clear, but sets no barriers when not clear. Conversely, in the hands of other constitutional actors, the Constitution could be considered a political document that sets a few specific barriers, but primarily presents the principles by which the government is supposed to run. Which group is correct is a political and philosophical issue to be resolved-slowly, if at all-by the three branches of the government and the citizenry through discussion, litigation, and elections. 146 Constitutional interpretation is an iterative process through which the President and other constitutional actors guide the Constitution's meaning, and the Constitution's meaning guides the constitutional actors. 146. See Nelson, supra note 96, at 546 (discussing Ronald Dworkin's theory that the Constitution may enshrine principles that may morph when applied to different situations over time).
147. See id. at 526-28 (noting that some framers envisioned an iterative process of constitutional interpretation would not always rely on judicial decision making). UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
text. Nonetheless, those interpretations may serve the country well. In those contexts, the text arguably need not constrain presidential constitutional interpretation, even if the Constitution remains a legal document. However, even if each branch is allowed some latitude to interpret the Constitution, the effects of their interpretation may be limited by how their fellow coequal constitutional actors interpret the Constitution.
IV. DEPARTMENTALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Departmentalism is "the theory that each of the three branches has the right-and the obligation-to interpret the Constitution for itself." 148 It rests on a strong vision of separation of powers that gives the President the responsibility to interpret the Constitution for the executive branch. 149 Departmentalism demands presidential constitutional interpretation and arguably encourages aggressive presidential constitutional interpretation. A President may defer to other branches with respect to constitutional interpretation, but departmentalism provides support for aggressive constitutional interpretation.
The scope of the President's latitude to interpret the Constitution and to act on her interpretation may depend on the scope of the duty or right of coequal constitutional branches to interpret the Constitution. 150 Members of Congress and the Supreme Court must take oaths to support the Constitution. 151 Congress should interpret the Constitution to ensure that legislation it passes is constitutional. 152 The judiciary must 148. BRUFF, supra note 1, at 65; see also Kelley, supra note 3, at 79 (noting President Reagan's championing of departmentalism).
149. For a defense of departmentalism, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison).
150. See COOPER, supra note 15, at 224 ("The fact that Presidents, like other constitutional officers, should be concerned about the constitutionality of their actions does not mean that they have a definitive authority to pronounce on the constitutionality of the actions of other institutions or to define the boundaries of their own authority."). An aggressive use of signing statements to claim the right to decline to execute laws can be problematic. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 208 ("[A]lthough there are legitimate uses of signing statements, their systematic use to expand Presidential authority or to justify the refusal of the President to execute the laws faithfully presents a threat to the separation of powers system and the constitutional balance among the three branches.").
151. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 152. United States Senators and Representatives must, on oath or affirmation, promise to support the Constitution. Id.
interpret the Constitution when determining the applicability of statutes. 153 The Supreme Court's and Congress's interpretations of the Constitution arguably bind the President and limit his interpretation of the Constitution. However, the limitation may be much less robust than it appears at first glance.
A. The Scope of Congressional Constitutional Interpretation
Departmentalism suggests that Congress should interpret the Constitution. Though members of Congress have an obligation to pass only those laws that they believe are constitutional, Congress may unintentionally pass unconstitutional laws. That possibility has been recognized since the country's founding. 154 Congress's belief that a law it has passed is constitutional need not bind the President to treat the law as constitutional. If one of the implications of departmentalism is that each branch is supposed to make independent judgments regarding constitutional interpretation, congressional constitutional interpretation should not necessarily limit the President's constitutional interpretation.
Congress and the President are coequal constitutional actors. 155 Neither is a court, and neither has a stronger claim to being able to divine constitutional meaning. Consequently, the President may have no obligation to presume that a law is constitutional merely because Congress believes it to be constitutional. The President may, as a matter of respect, consider Congress's views when determining whether a law is constitutional. However, Congress's belief that a law is constitutional need not bind the President if the President has an independent obligation to assess a law's constitutionality based on the presidential oath of office. Indeed, that oath may require that the President stop executive branch officials from executing laws he believes to be unconstitutional. 156 153. Federal judges must, on oath or affirmation, promise to support the Constitution. See id.
154. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466-68 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing judicial review of legislation).
155. The Constitution does not make one the superior of the other. See U.S. CONST. art. I, II.
156. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 211-14 (discussing how signing statements UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
B. The Scope of the Supreme Court's Constitutional Interpretation
How departmentalism meshes with judicial review is trickier. If judicial review means anything, the Supreme Court should be the last word on the Constitution's meaning. The Court's judgments must be followed; its interpretation of the Constitution arguably binds the President and Congress. 157 A Supreme Court decision can bind the other branches in one of three ways. First, the executive may be bound by the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation when that interpretation is embedded in a judgment the executive must enforce. 158 The Court has the duty, based on its oath to support the Constitution, to decline to issue a judgment based on an unconstitutional law. However, the Supreme Court's interpretive supremacy could be limited only to the cases before it. 159 The Supreme Court is responsible for deciding cases, but arguably does not have the right to be the last word on cases not in front of it. 160 Indeed, Presidents may be unwilling to follow Supreme Court rulings any further than required by the Court's decision. 161 Second, the Court's opinion on a statute's constitutionality can, should, and should not be used to guide executive branch officials).
157. Some argue that should not be the case. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1348 (2006) ("This Essay will argue that judicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode of final decisionmaking in a free and democratic society.").
158. However, presidential recalcitrance or threats to decline to enforce judgments or abide by court decision can be problematic. See BRUFF, supra note 1, at 255 (discussing the German saboteurs case in which President Franklin Roosevelt made clear that he would resist a writ of habeas corpus and guarantee that the saboteurs would be tried by a military commission).
159. However, the Court's decision certainly binds the parties. See EPPS, supra note 90, at x-xi (citing President Lincoln's first inaugural address and its suggestion that a Supreme Court case binds the parties and is entitled to respect, but ought still be questioned by the people). 161. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1621 (" [T] here is a rich literature describing the Executive Branch practice of non-acquiescence-that is, a decision to enforce a court's judgment in favor of a particular party coupled with a refusal to employ the court's rationale in future cases."); see also EPPS, supra note 90, at x ("[A Supreme] Court decision resolves a specific dispute among specific parties at a specific time. What it does not do is end the debate.").
could be thought to apply in other legally similar cases or situations. 162 Under this view, the President and Congress should acquiesce to the Court's interpretation in cases that would seem to be governed by the Court's opinion, not merely because those cases likely would be decided in the same way as the prior case, but because the Court has been deemed the expositor of constitutional law. Presumably, the Supreme Court's decisions should apply not only to lower federal courts that will decide future similar cases, but to the country. 163 However, the President and Congress might retain the latitude to ignore the implications of the Court's decision and apply the unconstitutional statute in situations that the President and Congress believe to be legally distinct from the situations underlying the precedential cases the Court has already decided.
Third, a Supreme Court opinion could be thought to render the unconstitutional law void, with the President and Congress unable to apply the statute in any circumstance. 164 The President and Congress would be bound by the Court's opinion. However, even under this strongest form of judicial supremacy, Congress and the President may continue to pass legislation that appears to be unconstitutional under the Court's decision. 165 Of course, federal courts would be ready to deem such laws unconstitutional in relevant cases.
C. Implications
Departmentalism suggests that the President should interpret the Constitution for the executive branch. However, 162. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1623 (suggesting that President may be willing to take the Court's decision regarding constitutionality of legislation and apply it in similar circumstances).
163. Even if a President adopts a conservative view on constitutional interpretation, broader latitude may be appropriate when addressing congressional infringement on executive power. Legislation that relates to or curtails executive power might trigger the need for the President to interpret the Constitution even without Supreme Court approval. 168 The Constitution vests the executive power of the United States in the President. 169 Defending executive prerogative from legislative branch encroachment even in the absence of a judgment by the Supreme Court seems reasonable. 170 Indeed, the President may have a special obligation to address legislation that limits executive power.
166. Conversely, the President and Congress might be thought to have the same power to interpret the Constitution as the Supreme Court. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1644 ("[E]arly constitutional interpretation was utterly dominated by the Executive and Legislative Branches, with the Judiciary playing a minor, episodic role.").
167. The courts believe they have that responsibility. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (noting that interpreting the Constitution is the Court's function). However, some might cabin that authority. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1674 (suggesting that coequal constitutional branches should not have to defer to the judiciary: "It is one thing to consult and respectfully consider the constitutional wisdom offered by another branch; it is another to tether the President (or Congress) to the Judiciary's constitutional pronouncements.").
168. This may be necessary if the courts decline to police interbranch disputes, claiming that they trigger political questions. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 20, at 1109-10 (suggesting that courts often decline to police disputes between legislative and executive branches in areas involving foreign policy).
169. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 170. However, a President can go too far. See PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 227 ("[I]f the President maintains that Presidential executive authority and the commander-in-chief clause can overcome virtually any law that constrains the executive, then the executive is claiming unilateral control of the laws.").
Such action would police the Constitution's separation of powers structure and might be particularly sensible, as a law that limits executive authority may be unlikely to be reviewed by the courts unless the President challenges it.
What to do when the legislative branch has supposedly infringed on executive prerogative is an ongoing source of friction. A perceived infringement is at the core of Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the subject of the last part of this Article. In that case, the Court did not decide where the line between executive prerogative and legislative power should be drawn or how the President and Congress should police it, but it did consider the issue. In the process, the Zivotofsky Court indirectly commented on how the President may be allowed to interpret the Constitution. 
A. The Case
Zivotofsky addressed the President's authority to recognize foreign countries and Congress's right to limit that authority. 179 The United States has recognized Israel since 1948. 180 However, the recognition power includes the power to recognize the bounds of another country's territorial sovereignty. 181 Thus, congressional action that requires the President to contradict his determination regarding another country's sovereign borders is unconstitutional. 182 Congress's text was unconstitutional. That could be considered a cop-out in context given that 1) the provision's proper interpretation is clear and is contrary to the President's interpretation, and 2) there was little reason for Congress to pass the particular provision unless it was intended to be proscriptive. Various principles derived from constitutional text undergird the Zivotofsky decision. The Court suggested that Justice Jackson's Youngstown structure accurately represents the Constitution's approach to separation of powers; 201 that the United States must speak with one voice regarding certain foreign policy issues, notwithstanding shared power between Congress and the President in the foreign policy area; 202 and that the President has primary authority to speak for the United States on certain issues. 203 The need to rely heavily on principle rather than text may help explain why Justice Breyer suggested that the issue in this case is a political question that should have been left to the political branches to resolve. 204 Fundamentally, Zivotofsky relied on constitutional principles rather than purely on constitutional text to determine the subject legislation's constitutionality. That approach may have important implications for how presidents may interpret the Constitution.
C. Implications
Zivotofsky endorses a method of constitutional analysis that encourages broad executive power. 205 The Court found that the President has inherent power in foreign policy matters based on general principles of constitutional law, rather than based solely on constitutional text. 206 By focusing as much on constitutional principles and historical practice as on constitutional text, the Court's approach may suggest that presidential constitutional interpretation may also focus more on constitutional principles and historical practice than on constitutional text. 207 The Zivotofsky Court decided the case in UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 a manner that may suggest that Presidents ought to have wide-ranging power to interpret the Constitution and act on those interpretations. 208 By reading the Constitution as it did, the Zivotofsky Court supports the argument that the executive's power is nearly supreme in certain areas of foreign policy. 209 The Court encourages the President to read the Constitution broadly and aggressively in the foreign policy area and in other areas involving executive power. 210 In the wake of Zivotofsky, the President arguably should have the latitude to resist congressional mandates in almost any situation where he might be called by Congress to contradict himself on a policy matter that is given to him to decide. That may create more interbranch disputes. The Supreme Court's inability or unwillingness to solve certain interbranch disputes may create a power struggle between the political branches that must be resolved by politics. 211 That may be the preferred method of constitutional interpretation and resolution whenever constitutional interpretation veers away from pure text-based interpretation and toward principles-based interpretation. However, there is a danger that both the executive and legislative branches will eventually use self-help. 212 Presidential self-help could take the form of additional constitutional signing statements. A strong vision of the executive power vesting clause might lead to a vision of the unitary executive that would seem to provide a sufficient 210. Arguably, the executive branch already does that. See SHANE, supra note 2, at 113 (suggesting that the executive branch tends to read the Constitution as broadly as possible-to its "furthest analytically plausible limit"-when it interprets executive power under the Constitution).
211. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 134, at 430 ("More generally, dismissals on political question grounds can be understood as a form of judicial underenforcement of the Constitution. On that understanding, the only difference between political question dismissals and deference to historical practice may be the extent of the deference. In either case, the judiciary places the constitutional answer substantially in the hands of the political branches.").
212. Of course, the executive may always use self-help. See Kelley, supra note 3, at 86 ("The Presidential signing statement, in all of its forms, will continue to play a role in future presidencies because it enables the President to win battles that he may not be able to win in the normal course of the legislative process. The strategic use of the signing statement also demonstrates the importance of the executive's aggressive constitutional interpretation when the tools of the modern presidency break down.").
constitutional basis on which to rest a constitutional signing statement pledging resistance to any congressional mandate affecting executive power. 213 Constitutional signing statements challenging Congress's asserted interference with executive power would seem particularly appropriate. As important, constitutional signing statements might be appropriate in other areas that concern or define executive power. The Zivotofsky opinion suggests that the scope in which the President can claim primary authority to act is broad, making constitutional signing statements in such areas more appropriate than they might seem otherwise. Given that some limits on executive power may be less likely to be challenged unless the executive branch challenges them, issuing constitutional signing statements and waiting for Congress or others to challenge the interpretation embedded in the signing statements may make practical sense.
The President's general approach to constitutional signing statements arguably should be to push presidential constitutional interpretation as far as possible to provide precedent for pushing presidential constitutional interpretation as far as possible in the future. 214 Some may argue that this is not new because executive power has been expanding for more than two centuries, and that an attempt to limit it might be deemed revolutionary. 215 Nonetheless, Zivotofsky provides additional arguments for the further expansion of executive 214. Some have made that point with respect to signing statements. See COOPER, supra note 15, at 219-20 (noting that some have used prior presidential signing statements as precedent for new signing statements); SHANE, supra note 2, at 141-42 (noting that signing statements arguably have the effect of treating extreme presidential interpretation as the norm with the result that people can look to the signing statements as having some legitimate legal standing on their own); Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 143-44. For a comparison of the numbers of signing statements issued from the Hoover Administration through the beginning of the final year of the George W. Bush Administration, see PFIFFNER, supra note 4, at 199.
215. See Moore, supra note 141, at 1044 (noting that Congress may not be in the position to check the expansion of executive power); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 20, at 1099 (noting that some scholars do not believe that the President is much constrained at all by law); Fallon, supra note 41, at 350 (referencing arguments that suggest politics, rather than law, may be all that currently constrains the President). UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 power and self-help. Of course, self-help could become harmful. The President may issue increasing numbers of constitutional signing statements with Congress possibly responding by claiming that all parts of a statute are nonseverable. 216 That might make any decision regarding the constitutionality of a statutory provision a decision regarding the validity of the whole statute. 217 That is not a palatable solution as it would bind the executive and the judiciary to the requirement that deeming any part of legislation unconstitutional would require jettisoning the remainder of the legislation. More importantly, it has the potential to invalidate legislation that is overwhelmingly beneficial to the country.
In the alternative, Zivotofsky may provide little help to a President who wants to act on a broad interpretation of the Constitution. Substantively, the Zivotofsky Court agreed with President Bush's interpretation that the statutory provision at issue was unconstitutional, but may not have agreed with President Bush's assumption that he could issue a signing statement and refuse to execute the law. 218 A President may interpret the Constitution as broadly or as narrowly as the President wishes when generally opining on the content of the Constitution. However, whenever the President declines to enforce statutory law based on his interpretation of the Constitution, the President may have an obligation to wait until the federal courts interpret the Constitution or to interpret the Constitution in a manner that so closely follows its text that almost no one would disagree with the President's position. 219 The Zivotofsky Court may have merely decided a case and clarified constitutional principles in the process. The case does not necessarily suggest that President Bush should have issued the signing statement at issue and defied the law. That issue relates to a President's presumed capacity to act on presidential constitutional interpretation. The problem, of course, is that the right to interpret the Constitution broadly suggests the right to act on that interpretation, particularly in situations in which a failure to act means the loss of executive power afforded by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution may provide the President the latitude to interpret the document aggressively and to act on the interpretation. The presidential oath and the Take Care Clause may encourage the President to interpret the Constitution before declining to enforce constitutionally suspect laws. 220 The President may have an obligation to decline to enforce federal law that is clearly unconstitutional. However, the President presumably should reach that conclusion only if the statute clearly conflicts with the Constitution's text leaving more contested constitutional interpretation to the federal courts.
The tension between providing broad latitude and narrow latitude for the President to interpret the Constitution was addressed implicitly by the Supreme Court in Zivotofsky v. Kerry. The Zivotofsky Court's analysis of the President's recognition power did not hew closely to text. Rather, it was based on a mélange of text, precedent, and past practice. Arguably, that is how constitutional interpretation should work when resolving interbranch disputes. 221 Fundamentally, constitutional interpretation is an iterative process through which the President, Congress, and the Supreme Court that text matters and focusing almost solely on text to reveal its meaning.").
220. Of course, what the Take Care Clause demands is unclear. See Chambers, supra note 165, at 122-23 ("In the wake of the Court's limited discussions of the Take Care Clause, the Clause can be considered to provide both a duty requiring the Executive to enforce the law as the legislation demands and a license allowing the President to interpret statutes in the context of determining how to enforce them.").
221. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 134, at 412-13 ("Arguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers. These arguments are especially common in debates over the distribution of authority between Congress and the executive branch."); Strauss, supra note 19, at 61. UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
interpret the Constitution, with the people eventually responding. 222 Practically, presidential constitutional interpretation has strayed from the Constitution's text since the beginning of the Republic. 223 In the wake of Zivotofsky, the President has little reason to stop claiming broad executive authority through constitutional signing statements. 224 The President exercises broad executive authority that Congress cannot infringe. That broad authority can be based on principles underlying the Constitution rather than based directly on clear text. Consequently, a constitutional signing statement may be the most appropriate tool for the President to use to force the resolution of murky constitutional issues. When there was reason to believe that the Supreme Court might cabin executive power, the use of a constitutional signing statement could be thought inappropriately aggressive. However, after Zivotofsky, a constitutional signing statement can be considered a placeholder for future litigation regarding the breadth of the President's executive authority.
Constitutional interpretation that is tied to constitutional principles rather than directly to constitutional text may be reasonably necessary to allow our Republic to continue to work. The President may need more executive authority than the U.S. Constitution originally contemplated, and the Constitution may need to embrace the full range of possible interpretations based on its text and the principles underlying it to make for a more perfect union. Concerns that Presidents ought to be limited in how they interpret the Constitution may have been justified at some point in the past. However, given how Presidents have interpreted the Constitution and how the Court would seem to allow the President the latitude to interpret the Constitution in certain areas, such as foreign policy, it may be well past time to claim that the President
